Personal Formation and Utilitarianism in the Trolley Problem

So, what follows here is my writing sample for grad school applications.  It mostly speaks for itself, but I'm very proud of it and I thought that some of y'all might want to read it.  Also, I don't feel like really writing a post today, so this is what you get.  I hope you like it,

-J.R.M.C.


Since its introduction by Philipa Foote in 1978, the Trolley Problem has remained a staple in discussions of consequentialist and deontological ethical theories.  In its most basic form, the problem asks whether it is better to allow the death of five persons or to cause the death of a single person.#  Normally, the dilemma is presented to illustrate the quintessential difference between Utilitarian ethics and other ethical systems which evaluate certain actions as intrinsically wrong or right, regardless of their outcome.  The traditional candidate for the latter is usually some form Kantian Deontological ethics or Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, both of which tend to evaluate as essentially wrong the choice to sacrifice one person in order to save five others.  In contrast, some form of Mill’s Utilitarianism is usually postulated as the opposing response, which evaluates the termination and subsequent loss of one life as quantitatively better than the loss of five lives.  This stark contradiction between the Utilitarian and Deontological answers has been historically important in seeking an answer to the Trolley Problem, but it is nonetheless possible to reach both conclusions (to allow the death of five persons or to cause the death of one,) within Utilitarian theory.  It is possible, if standard Utilitarian theory is modified with some of the insights of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, to justify both decisions in a strictly Utilitarian calculation.  This paper will seek to prove that when the formative results of an action on the agent of that action are factored into a Utilitarian calculation of the Trolley problem as actual consequences thereof, it is possible that some individuals would be justified in choosing to not redirect the trolley.
Of course, one can hardly help but ask why this project is necessary.  To the casual observer, the somewhat obvious question is whether any modification to Utilitarian theory is necessary and, if so, why it is.  The primary justification for modifying the system is that recent psychological research suggests that very few, if any, persons actually consider the consequential or deontological aspects of a decision separately.  Rather, individuals tend to make hybrid considerations of both consequential utility and intrinsic wrongness or rightness.#  In short, there is a tendency within most persons studied to combine Utilitarian criteria and intrinsic criteria.  This being the case, it seems natural that ethical theory might develop to better suit what psychologists understand as normative patterns of thought.
Nonetheless, before exploring modifications to Utilitarianism, it will be necessary to reaffirm the basic presuppositions of Mill’s Utilitarian theory.  Its central assertion is “...that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”#  In other words, the central determining factor of an action’s moral rightness or wrongness is the tendency of that action to create happiness or pain.  An important distinction between what is more properly called hedonism and Mill’s full Utilitarianism is that, for Mill, pleasure is both greater and more valuable as it pertains to a higher nature.#  Thus, while a delicious meal is certainly pleasurable and good, it is significantly less valuable in a Utilitarian calculation than a pleasure of a higher order, like enjoying a conversation.  

Another principle of Mill’s Utilitarianism which will be important to its modification herein is his conception of sacrificial virtue.  Mill contends that virtue for virtue’s sake is worthless, and tends too much after “the ascetic mounted on his pillar.”#  However, in his consideration, virtue as a human quality is valuable inasmuch as humans that are virtuous tend to create more happiness than individuals who are not virtuous.#  Thereby, Mill claims that while virtue is not in and of itself valuable, persons who practice the virtues are valuable because by their practice of virtue they tend to create more happiness.  It is not, then, too much to say that actions may be moral within the Utilitarian calculation both because they create happiness and because they create an individual who is capable of creating more happiness.  To give an example, a man who cooks a meal for his sick neighbor accomplishes three separate aims.  First, he relieves his sick neighbor from the toil of preparing a dinner while sick.  Second, he himself is likely to receive the pleasure that often accompanies the assistance of a fellow in need.  These first two ends are standard within most Utilitarian calculations.  However, the consequences of his actions reach even further.  A third and less obvious benefit to both the man himself and society at large is that by cooking dinner for a sick neighbor, the man in question becomes a more generous person.  By acting in a certain way, we become more and more the kind of person who acts in a certain way.  If today I make dinner for my sick neighbor, I take a single step towards forming habits of generosity that will create more happiness than acting otherwise would do.  It may furthermore be said that this habit-forming aspect of virtuous actions places them in a qualitatively higher sphere of pleasurable experiences than most other experiences because it pertains to a higher nature than most other actions.  

There is potential for justifying this classification within Mill himself.  As Marcus G. Singer points out in his article, “Actual Consequence Utilitarianism”, both Bentham and Mill utilize the language of tendency in their evaluation of moral right and moral wrong.#  It is crucial, in reading Mill’s primary assertion to realize that the word tend indicates both a prospective focus on an action’s rightness and a generalized quality to the nature of that prediction.  Something is right inasmuch as doing that particular action or other actions like it has a general tendency to produce more happiness.
Happiness, as stated earlier, tends to be produced by the actions of virtuous individuals.  Thus, actions in any context may be justified if the virtue practiced in an action is likely to create more happiness in the world than the omission of that virtue is.  Therefore, in the earlier case of cooking dinner for a sick friend, the action is justified so long as the actual benefits to both parties along with the formational prospects of the action outweigh any negative effects of the decision such as a strain on one’s finances or leisure.  Similarly, the negative habituation against the virtues which occurs from the omission of a virtuous action or the commission of a morally wrong act must be factored in.  Therefore, if one chooses to refrain from preparing dinner for his or her sick neighbor, that action can only be considered ethical so long as the pleasure gained from the independent use of that time outweighs both the neighbor’s experiences and the fact that the agent is now, even in the slightest way, a more selfish and less virtuous person.
This notion is supported by Aristotle’s habituation principle, found in his Nicomachean Ethics.  Aristotle writes:

...by doing things in our interactions with human beings, some of us become just, others unjust; and by doing things in terrifying circumstances and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, some of us become courageous, others cowards.  The case is similar as regards desires and bouts of anger.  For some people become moderate and gentle, others licentious and irascible, the former as a result of conducting themselves in the one way, the latter as a result of do so in the other.  And so, in a word, the characteristics come into being as a result of the activities akin to them.#

In other words, we accomplish the virtues and become more virtuous kinds of people by nothing more or less than practicing the virtues.  As any particular man does more and more courageous things, he becomes more courageous, and the same is true both for any of the virtues and for any of the vices.

Furthermore, as M.F. Burnyeat states in his essay, “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good”, for Aristotle the practice of virtue is both good in and of itself and because it is the means by which one may come to know and better understand the virtues.#  For Aristotle, good ethics and moral behavior are necessary before we can even begin to comprehend what the ultimate good is, but they are also the primary path to the ultimate good itself.  There is then a certain sense in which virtuous behavior is a kind of positive feedback loop: the more virtuous one is in his or her choices, that individual becomes more and more likely to behave virtuously and to grasp the ultimate good in all of her choices.  The inverse of this is also true, that as an individual neglects the development of his or her moral fiber, that individual becomes more and more likely to make vicious decisions.

These considerations being taken into account, it is necessary that as one goes about making a Utilitarian calculation, one considers both the direct effects of a decision, (the pleasure or pain created directly by the act) and the formative consequences of that act on its agent.  If this consideration is neglected, the single most important consequence of most human actions is avoided, since most human actions only directly affect a small number of persons.  The only individual consistently affected by every decision that an individual makes is that individual herself.  Therefore, to avoid the formative consequences of an act while considering its experiential consequences is ultimately both inconsiderate to the agent in question and an irresponsible neglect of the basic principles of habituation.  This principle is reiterated in John Dewey’s essay, “The Nature of Aims”.  He writes:

Certainly nothing can justify or condemn means except ends, results.  But we have to include consequences impartially.  Even admitting that lying will save a man’s soul, whatever that may mean, it would still be true that lying will have other consequences, namely, the usual consequences that follow from tampering with good faith and that lead lying to be condemned.  It is wilful folly to fasten upon some single end or consequence which is liked, and permit the view of that to blot from perception all other undesired and undesirable consequences.#

This reiterates the underlying sentiment of a formative consideration of Utilitarianism: regardless of an action’s experiential consequences, even if they are of the highest order and greatest amount, it is fundamentally necessary to consider the effect of any action on the character of that individual.

Moving on from these premises, it is necessary to return to the Trolley Problem itself.  The problem, in its most general form, is as follows:  You are within reaching distance of a lever which can change the direction of the trolley tracks directly before you.  If you do not pull the lever, the tracks will continue along path A, whereas if you do pull the lever the tracks will be shifted to path B.  On path A there are five persons, and on path B there is a single person.  You become aware of a trolley, barreling down the tracks at a lethal speed.  If you do not touch the lever, the five people on path A will die but you will have simply allowed their deaths.  In contrast, if you flip the lever, only the person on path B will die, but you will have caused his or her death.  These are the only two options in the dilemma, the consequences are assured and there is no way that all six individuals can be saved.#

As stated earlier, this dilemma normally functions to illustrate the basic principles of Utilitarianism through its general preference for the second option.  Quite simply, most consequentialist estimations of the two prospective outcomes evaluate the loss of five lives as substantially worse than the loss of one life.  However, simply evaluating the direct consequences of flipping the lever and causing one person’s death, namely the saving of five persons over and against the saving of one, is an incomplete evaluation of the problem.  Such a consideration does not give enough regard to the internal state of the individual or to the formative effects that flipping the lever might have on a particular individual.

It may be that some people, especially those who frequently make decisions involving the life or death of large numbers of people, would be justified in choosing to not change the direction of the trolley.  If so, they would be justified because the formative effect that action would have on them as an individual would make them less likely to create pleasure for a large number of people in the future.  Such persons, however few, may include heads of state, military leaders, and executives that oversee large companies.  Essentially, the decision to allow five deaths would be potentially justifiable for any man or woman who must give primary regard to the following of significant rules (i.e. national, international or federal regulations, etc.) in their Utilitarian calculations.  There are quite simply some people who, for the sake of general utility, cannot afford to get in the habit of personally causing even one death.  For these individuals, the sheer potential for harming others which is available to them could justify the allowance of five deaths.  If today the President of the United States is somehow forced into the trolley dilemma, he may be justified in allowing the five people on path A to die because there are fairly reasonable scenarios in which the habits formed by sacrificing the person on path B would be devastating.  An example will serve to explain.

Imagine that there are five U.S. citizens being held prisoner by a terrorist organization.  There is no information on the exact whereabouts of the citizens, and thus military action to accomplish their rescue is impossible.  Image that furthermore, there is a member of the terrorist organization in question in U.S. custody.  This individual knows the whereabouts of the citizens, and normal interrogation methods have failed to extract that information.  For the sake of creating a dilemma, let us say that the President’s choice in this scenario is limited to allowing the death of five citizens or torturing a terrorist to save those five citizens.  In such a situation, the international outcry and the extent to which the sheer rage of many extremist groups would be provoked would likely cause more than five deaths, so allowing the deaths is a better, more Utilitarian option.  However, a president who has decided to sacrifice the person on path B in the trolley problem would likely be more prone to torture the terrorist.  As such, I would propose that a president faced with this theoretical scenario would be fairly justified in choosing to allow the deaths of the five people on path A.

This is not, of course, to say that all or even most people in powerful positions would be justified in the same decision.  As a matter of fact, I think it is fairly clear that most of the time decisions which are often pejoratively labeled Utilitarian for their grim consequences, decisions like sacrificing the person on path B or sacrificing the lives of 100 people so that 1000 might live, are still the only justified decisions.  All I have sought to prove here is that sometimes, for some people in very specific circumstances, allowing the death of five people in the trolley problem may be justified.  It is true that this justification would only be applicable to a very small number of people in a very small number of situations, but such is to be expected of a more pragmatic Utilitarianism.  Brian Ellis predicts as much in his article “Retrospective and Prospective Utilitarianism.”  Therein, Ellis seeks to formulate what a pragmatic, practical Utilitarianism might look like for the common man.  He proposes a kind of loose rule-based Utilitarianism, but importantly he acknowledges that in the formulation of any Utilitarian ethical conception, “...we should not expect to be able to formulate a practical ethical system applicable to all societies at all times.”#  Almost certainly, then, especially considering the particularly personal nature of the factors at play in formational considerations, it is reasonable to expect that two persons may come to completely different justified conclusions in a large number of situations.  It is therefore reasonable that different persons could be specifically obliged to act differently in congruent situations like the Trolley Problem.

In conclusion, one may see with relative ease that for certain individuals, the negative formational results of causing one person’s death may outweigh the positive results of saving the lives of five persons.  If this is the case, then those individuals are justified in choosing to allow the death of five persons, and they are justified in a strictly Utilitarian sense.

Works Cited

Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics.  Trans Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011

Burnyeat,‭ ‬M.F.,‭ ‬“Aristotle on Learning to Be Good.‭”‬ Aristotle‭’‬s Ethics:‭ ‬Critical Essays‭ ‬ed.‭ ‬Nancy Sherman.‭  ‬Lanham,‭ ‬Maryland:‭ ‬Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.,‭ ‬1999.‭  ‬Pp.‭ ‬205-230.

Dewey, John, “The Nature of Aims.” Aristotle’s Ethics: Issues and Interpretations ed. James J. Walsh and Henry L. Shapiro.  Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company Inc., 1967.  Pp.  47-55.

Ellis,‭ ‬Bryan.‭ ‬“Retrospective and Prospective Utilitarianism.‭”‬  Nous‭ ‬15/3‭ (‬1981‭)‬:‭ ‬325-339.

Mill, John Stuart.  Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government.  New York: 1951.

Singer,‭ ‬Marcus G.‭ ‬“Actual Consequence Utilitarianism.‭”‬  Mind‭ ‬86/341‭ (‬1977‭)‬:‭ ‬pp.‭ ‬67-77.

Shallow,‭ ‬Christopher,‭ ‬Ruman Iliev and Douglas Medin.‭ ‬“Trolley Problems in Context.‭”‬ Judgement and Decision Making‭ ‬6/7‭ (‬2011‭)‬:‭ ‬pp.‭ ‬593-601.

Waldman,‭ ‬Michael R.‭ ‬and Jorn H.‭ ‬Dietrich.‭  ‬“Throwing a Bomb on a Person vs.‭ ‬Throwing a Person on a Bomb:‭ ‬Intervention Myopia in Moral Intuitions.‭”‬  Psychological Science‭ ‬18/3‭ (‬2007‭)‬:‭ ‬pp.‭ ‬247-253.